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Legislation aimed at stabilizing housing markets since the recession has focused 
on providing funding to acquire and remediate foreclosed and abandoned homes 
or providing ﬁ  nancial assistance and incentives to purchase homes. Cuyahoga 
County has received over $100 million in such funds since 2008. We investi-
gate the impact of these funds on vacancy rates. We examine neighborhoods in 
Cuyahoga County where National Stabilization Program dollars were spent and 
ﬁ  nd that the program helped reduce vacancies in neighborhoods where properties 
were primarily purchased for consumption purposes.
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Bank of Cleveland, and she can be reached at lisa.a.nelson@clev.frb.org. 1. Introduction 
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), enacted by Congress in July 2008, 
was an ambitious piece of housing legislation intended to shore up a slumping housing 
market and mitigate the effects of the foreclosure crisis, among other things.    One of 
the components of this act is the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (known as NSP1), 
which authorized the allocation of $4 billion in block grant funds to states and local 
governments for the acquisition and rehabilitation or demolition of foreclosed and 
abandoned properties.   The funds could also be used to resell the properties and to 
provide financing for their redevelopment or purchase.  Six cities and five suburbs in 
Cuyahoga County received approximately $48 million.    
Seven months after HERA was enacted, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) was signed into law, providing an additional $1.93 billion dollars toward 
neighborhood stabilization activities.  This second round of funding for neighborhood 
stabilization is known as NSP2.  Cuyahoga County received $40.8 million.  Cleveland 
received its own allocation of $16 million, half of which was used for demolition.     
The intent of this paper is to quantify the extent to which the NSP interventions 
impacted the stability of the Cuyahoga County housing market above and beyond the 
impact of homebuyer tax credit incentives included in the same legislation.  As a 
measure of market stability, we use vacancy rates.  We examine the vacancy rate of 
properties that were previously owned by the lender (called real estate owned or REO) 
in and around areas targeted for NSP dollars.  Focusing on REO transactions alone helps us control for heterogeneity in property histories before the first observed 
transaction in our dataset.  We control for a variety of property and neighborhood 
characteristics, as well as the intended use of the property after the purchase out of 
REO---as a residence for the buyer (“consumption”) or as an investment. 
We find that, overall, there is a negligible difference between the vacancy rates of 
former-REO properties in areas that received funding under the NSP1 and the vacancy 
rates among matched properties in non-NSP1 areas.  The overall impact of NSP2 is also 
negligible.  However, when we control for whether the buyer is buying for 
consumption or investment, we find an impact.  Current vacancy rates of former-REO 
properties are lower in NSP areas than in non-NSP areas for properties that were 
purchased for consumption. 
Our paper contributes to the growing body of evidence on what happens to a property 
after it is sold out of REO.   Much of the research on the REO market focuses on who is 
buying and selling the REO properties, the geographic location of REO sales, the selling 
prices of REO properties, and the time on the market.   
For example, Immergluck (2011) analyzed REO sales activity between 2005 and 2009 in 
Fulton County, Georgia.  He examined the length of time properties spent in REO prior 
to be being purchased, who purchased the REOs, and at what price level.   He found 
that investors have purchased an increasing share of REO properties over time and that 
they were more likely to purchase the lower-valued properties (less than $30,000) in lower-income neighborhoods.   Also, in neighborhoods with high levels of low-value 
REO sales, many of these properties remain vacant and distressed after the purchase. 
In another study, Coulton, et al. (2010) examined REO sales activity and post-REO 
property values in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.   Comparing the market value of properties 
prior to foreclosure and the sales price after they emerged from REO status, the 
researchers found properties that left REO status in 2009 were selling for only 28 
percent of their pre-foreclosure estimated market value compared to 76 percent for 
properties that left REO status in 2004.   They also found that of those REOs selling for 
extremely distressed prices (less than $10,000) between 2004 and 2009, 49 percent were 
vacant by early 2010.    
Unlike these two studies, our study takes into account differences across geographic 
locations that may be attributable to the presence of stabilization funds. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes our data and 
statistical methods.  The third section presents the results.  Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data and Method 
We evaluate the impact of the NSP funds on Cuyahoga County’s REO market through 
its effect on the current vacancy status of former-REO properties.  We concentrate on 
REO properties for two reasons.  First, as properties that have already gone through 
foreclosure, REOs are vacant and vulnerable to vandalism and deterioration.  An 
intervention that reduces vacancies would be most valuable to the neighborhoods.  Second, REO status provides a common starting point for all the properties.  In the 
absence of a common starting point, the history of the property at the time of the first 
transaction (the type of seller, vacancy status, the reason for sale) becomes relevant.  
REO properties, by contrast, are all owned by a financial institution or government 
agency and they are all vacant initially. 
We identify the areas that were targeted by NSP (1 and 2) funds by examining the NSP 
plans that were developed by each community. The plans described how and where the 
community intended to use the funds. In most cases, these areas were particular census 
tracts within a community, without any reference to specific properties.  Within the city 
of Cleveland, we know exactly which properties were targeted by NSP 1 and which 
census block those properties are in. 
Note that the same census block may have been targeted by either NSP 1 or NSP 2 or it 
may have been targeted by both.  To capture different block types, we split the sample 
in six categories, depicted in Figure 1, and analyze each one separately.  The first 
category contains properties that are in a census block targeted by NSP 1, the second 
contains properties in NSP 2 census blocks, the third has properties that are in NSP 1 
but not in NSP 2, the fourth contains properties in NSP 2 but not in 1, the fifth covers 
properties in census blocks covered by both NSPs, and the sixth is the full sample, that 
is properties in blocks targeted by NSP 1 or 2. 
Information on property sales, including the address and parcel number, the identity of 
the buyer and the seller and the transaction price, comes from Cuyahoga County auditor records from 2006 until the end of 2010. We include only residential 
properties—single-family homes, two-family homes, three-family homes, and 
condominiums.   Properties with a sales amount of zero are excluded from the 
analysis.1
We group the REO buyers into three categories: investors, nonprofits, and individuals.  
REO sellers are either government agencies or banks/mortgage servicers.  We cannot 
distinguish between banks that own the mortgage and those that act as a servicer, but 
we do distinguish between local banks and nonlocal banks, where localness means 
having a branch in the county.   
 
We assigned buyers and sellers to the appropriate categories using information in the 
county record. First, we looked at buyers’ and sellers’ names. For example, names 
which included LLC, CO, Group, or Inc. were placed in the investor group.  Next, we 
looked at the number of properties any one person has bought or sold. Individuals who 
bought or sold more than three properties over a five-year period (2006-2010) were also 
placed in the investor group. Individuals who bought or sold fewer than four properties 
over the five-year period were classified as individuals.    
In addition to data on sales transactions, we obtained information about property 
characteristics from Cuyahoga County auditor records. We also got data on the 
demographic characteristics of the census blocks, such as income, race, and educational 
                                                           
1HUD properties with a zero sales prices were found on the County Recorder’s site and the transfer amount was 
entered manually.  (For more information on this issue, see Coulton, et al. 2008.) attainment levels of the residents, from the Census Bureau, vacancy data from the 
United States Postal Service (USPS), and tax delinquency data from the Cuyahoga 
County treasurer.  
Estimation Strategy 
We measure the impact of the NSP by comparing the current vacancy status of 
formerly-REO properties inside and outside the areas that received NSP funds.  We 
focus only on properties sold out of REO after September 2008, when NSP allocations 
were announced.  Other incentives in the same legislation, such as the homebuyer tax 
credit, applied to all localities while NSP applied only to some.  We use this geographic 
discontinuity to identify the impact of NSP. 
We measure the impact using two different methods in order to ensure that our results 
are robust.  First, we run a logistic regression to estimate the probability that a property 
that was sold out of REO is vacant conditional on buyer type and whether it is in an 
NSP1 or 2 census block.  Also included in this part of the analysis are property and 
neighborhood characteristics, the time elapsed since the property has been out of REO 
and whether the seller was a local bank, nonlocal bank or a government agency (VA, 
FHA, housing GSEs).  A complete list of variables is in Table 1. 
Our second method accounts for the fact that real estate markets are highly localized 
and there may still be unobservable differences that cannot be captured by the 
covariates we have included in the logistic regression.  Table 2, Panel A shows the REO 
property characteristics inside and outside the NSP areas.  REO properties in NSP areas tend to be older, cheaper, and located in the city of Cleveland and in high-minority 
areas.  To get around this problem of unobserved characteristics, we take all our REO 
sales in NSP areas and match them with REO sales in non-NSP areas if the properties 
meet the following conditions: 
•  The matched property must be sold out of REO within 90 days of the sale of the 
NSP property 
•  Both properties must have the same property tax delinquency status. 
•  The non-NSP properties must be in census blocks within 1 mile of the properties 
in NSP- targeted census blocks  
•  Both properties must be purchased out of REO by the same type of buyer 
Note that as we vary the definition of NSP areas, as in Figure 1, the excluded properties 
(properties that received some NSP money but not covered by the particular NSP 
definition we are interested in) are not available as a match. 
We do not always get a unique match with this procedure.   Some properties have more 
than 40 matches that meet these conditions.  To find the best match for NSP properties 
with multiple matches, we calculate the distance between the NSP and the matched 
non-NSP properties based on total usable area of the property, age of the property and 
the sale price out of REO.  We choose the property with the minimum distance as the 
best match (procedure described in Bergstralh et al., 1996).  Table 2, Panel B shows the 
REO property characteristics inside and outside NSP areas in the matched sample.  Note that the properties are now very similar even in characteristics that were not used 
in the matching procedure. 
After the matching, we compare the average vacancy rates of NSP and non-NSP 
properties based on the type of buyer and whether the property has been sold again. 
3. Results 
Table 3, Panel A presents the results from a univariate analysis.  Investors are the most 
common buyers of REO properties inside and outside NSP 1 areas.  Results are similar 
for NSP 2 (not shown).  Nonprofits buy very few properties, but they also have the 
highest vacancy rates.  This is possibly because they purchase properties in the worst 
markets of the county.  Panel B confirms that properties bought by nonprofits have by 
far the lowest prices, are likely to be older, and are more likely to be in the minority-
dominated areas of Cleveland. 
Vacancy rates are higher for all types of REO buyers in NSP areas.  But once again, this 
could be because NSP areas are in worse shape than non-NSP areas to begin with.  Our 
logistic regressions take into account the disparities in neighborhood and property 
characteristics.  The results are in Table 4.  Current vacancy rates are still likely to be 
highest among nonprofit REO buyers, followed by investors, and lowest among 
individuals.  The presence of NSP dollars reduces vacancy rates only if the REO has 
been purchased by an individual and only in NSP 1 areas. NSP 2 had no impact on 
vacancies although its more recent history may be the culprit.  That is, if NSP dollars are stabilizing the areas they are invested in, one may have to observe these areas for a 
longer period than we did, to see the impact of greater stability. 
The other control variables appear with the expected signs.  Lower-priced, smaller, 
older, tax delinquent properties inside the city in high minority neighborhoods are 
more likely to be vacant today. 
In Table 5, we compare NSP properties with matched non-NSP properties.  While we 
lose some observations for which there is no match, the property and neighborhood 
characteristics of the observations that drop out of the sample are not statistically 
different from those of the observations that remain in the sample (results not shown).   
At first glance, the NSP does not seem to have made a difference.  Under the All 
column, vacancy rates inside and outside NSP areas are statistically indistinguishable.  
However, once we take the buyer heterogeneity into account, the matched dataset 
confirms that the vacancy rates decline if a property is purchased out of REO by an 
individual and only if the property is in an area targeted by NSP 1.  These results also 
show that vacancy rates are higher in NSP 1 areas if the property is purchased by an 
investor. 
Table 6 re-examines the data based on other transactions that may have taken place 
after the REO sale.  We do not track transactions beyond the second one.  If a property 
is returned to a bank or government agency, it is assumed to have gone through a new 
foreclosure.  If a sample has fewer than 10 observations, we do not run a difference of means test, as the sample is too small to be meaningful.  Because properties acquired by 
nonprofits and individuals have not gone through foreclosure in the second transaction, 
those columns are omitted from the tables. 
Once again, NSP 1 emerges as the program with a potential impact on vacancies.  
Properties that were purchased by investors and remained unsold are more likely to be 
vacant as of June 2011 if they were in an area targeted by NSP 1.  One could speculate 
that these are properties purchased with the expectation of a recovery in targeted areas, 
but that expectation has not paid off.  Individuals, on the other hand, seem to have 
benefited from NSP 1.  Those who have not resold their properties are less likely to have 
abandoned their properties in NSP 1 areas.  In other words, NSP 1 may have succeeded 
at stabilizing the housing market for individual homeowners. 
An important question, however, is whether various types of buyers changed their 
behaviors as a result of NSP.  In other words, if REO properties purchased by 
individuals in NSP 1 areas always had lower vacancy rates, our results are not a result 
of NSP but possibly the manifestation of some unobservable geographic characteristic.  
We address this issue in Table 7, albeit imperfectly due to data constraints.  Table 7 is a 
replica of Tables 5 and 6 but it includes REO properties purchased only before 
September 2008 in NSP 1 areas.   The data constraint is that our vacancy data goes as far 
back as March 2010.  That is, we can observe vacancies as early as 18 months after the last REO transaction in September 2008.  By contrast, in Table 5, we observe vacancies 
as of June 2011, six months after the last REO transaction in December 2010.2
With this caveat in mind, Table 7 shows that the vacancy outcomes of REO properties 
purchased before NSP 1 are indeed different.  Properties purchased by investors are 
significantly less likely to be vacant if they are located in an area that will be targeted by 
NSP 1.  There is no significant impact on REO properties purchased by individuals.  We 
can only speculate that the expectation that the NSP would provide stability may have 
caused less cautious behavior among investors. 
  
4. Conclusion 
NSP funds were intended to stabilize declining housing markets by assisting 
communities in dealing with the REO problem.  Our analysis shows that  ignoring REO 
buyer heterogeneity can be misleading.  NSP 1, in particular, seems to have reduced the 
incidence of vacancies in targeted areas.  However, it may also have caused less 
cautious behavior among the investors, who are currently sitting on a large number of 
vacant properties inside NSP 1 areas. 
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   Table 1 – Variable Definitions 
Variable  Description 
REO Seller: Local Bank 
Binary variable that equals one if the bank selling the REO property 
has a branch in Cuyahoga County  
REO Seller: Non-Local Bank 
Binary variable that equals one if the bank selling the REO property 
does not have a branch in Cuyahoga County or is a securitization 
trustee 
REO Seller: Government 
Binary variable that equals one if the REO seller is the VA, FHA, or 
the housing GSEs 
Post REO Conveyance Amount 
The sale price of the REO property out of REO; used in regressions in 
logged-form 
Tax Delinquency 
Binary variable that equals one if the property has been property tax 
delinquency in the six months prior to REO sale 
Age of Property (Years)  Used in regressions in logged-form 
Property Size (SqFt)  Area of the parcel; used in regressions in logged-form 
Neighborhood Vacancy Rate  Vacancy rate of the census block in 2000 Census 
Neighborhood: Educational 
Attainment Less than High School 
Percentage of the census block population with less than a high 
school degree in 2000 Census 
Neighborhood African American 
Population 
Percentage of the census block population that is African American 
in 2000 Census 
Neighborhood in Cleveland 
Binary variable that equals one if the property is located in the City 
of Cleveland 
 
   Table 2 – Panel A: Sample Statistics 
(In percentages unless indicated otherwise) 
 
PANELA–Full Sample  PANELB-Matched 
     




12,331  13,446  4,811  3,994 
 
NSP  5,905  4,790  4,811  3,994 
REO Seller: Local Bank 
Non-NSP 
Mean 
13  12  13  13 
NSP  12  14  12  14 
 
Means Test: t  2.57  (2.63)  0.56  (1.40) 
REO Seller: Non-Local Bank 
Non-NSP 
Mean 
62  62  67  66 
NSP  65  65  66  66 
 
Means Test: t  (3.96)  (4.01)  0.60  (0.17) 
REO Seller: Government 
Non-NSP 
Mean 
25  26  21  21 
NSP  23  21  22  20 
 
Means Test: t  2.46  6.57  (1.15)  1.39 
Post REO Conveyance Amount ($) 
Non-NSP 
Mean  44,165  42,471  16,889  15,248 
Median  25,800  25,000  8,500  9,000 
Std.Dev.  60,724  59,010  24,253  20,993 
Min  1  1  1  1 
Max  1,215,000 1,215,000  604,135  390,000 
NSP 
Mean  17,177  15,649  16,857  15,611 
Median  9,000  9,500  8,500  9,672 
Std.Dev.  21,029  18,425  21,092  17,626 
Min  1  1  1  1 
Max  218,500  285,000  218,500  212,500 
 




24  25  24  23 
NSP  28  27  24  23 
 
Means Test: t  (5.15)  (3.88)  0.00  0.00 
Age of Property (Years) 
Non-NSP 
Mean  76  76  87  89 
Median  82  81  90  90 
Std.Dev.  24  25  20  18 
Min  3  3  6  9 
Max  210  210  150  150 
NSP 
Mean  86  89  87  89 
Median  90  90  90  90 
Std.Dev.  22  20  22  20 
Min  4  5  4  5 
Max  210  200  210  170 
 
Means Test: t  (27.91)  (33.87)  (1.56)  1.20 (In percentages unless indicated otherwise) 
 
PANELA–Full Sample  PANELB-Matched 
     




12,331  13,446  4,811  3,994 
 
NSP  5,905  4,790  4,811  3,994 
Property Size(SqFt) 
Non-NSP 
Mean  1,550  1,529  1,510  1,496 
Median  1,393  1,372  1,404  1,395 
Std.Dev.  624  612  501  526 
Min  340  340  504  504 
Max  8,610  8,610  5,612  5,612 
NSP 
Mean  1,519  1,569  1,522  1,543 
Median  1,390  1,440  1,400  1,412 
Std.Dev.  541  560  528  539 
Min  429  480  429  480 
Max  4,995  4,995  4,995  4,995 
 
Means Test: t  3.18  (3.96)  (1.13)  (3.91) 
Neighborhood Vacancy Rate 
Non-NSP 
Mean  8  8  11  10 
Median  6  6  10  10 
Std.Dev.  5  6  6  5 
Min  0  0  1  1 
Max  41  31  31  28 
NSP 
Mean  12  12  12  12 
Median  11  13  12  12 
Std.Dev.  6  5  6  5 
Min  1  1  1  1 
Max  41  41  41  41 
 
Means Test: t  (50.24)  (44.21)  (13.59)  (11.14) 
Neighborhood: Educational 
Attainment Less than High School 
Non-NSP 
Mean  23  22  29  31 
Median  21  19  29  31 
Std.Dev.  13  13  13  12 
Min  0  0  0  0 
Max  76  76  76  66 
NSP 
Mean  28  31  28  32 
Median  28  30  29  30 
Std.Dev.  13  11  13  11 
Min  5  2  5  2 
Max  76  68  76  68 
 
Means Test: t  (25.95)  (47.08)  0.31  (1.92) (In percentages unless indicated otherwise) 
 
PANELA–Full Sample  PANELB-Matched 
     




12,331  13,446  4,811  3,994 
 
NSP  5,905  4,790  4,811  3,994 
Neighborhood African American 
Population 
Non-NSP 
Mean  40  40  60  61 
Median  16  18  81  89 
Std.Dev.  40  39  39  40 
Min  0  0  0  0 
Max  100  100  100  100 
NSP 
Mean  63  66  64  66 
Median  70  93  75  94 
Std.Dev.  36  37  36  38 
Min  0  2  0  2 
Max  100  100  100  100 
 
Means Test: t  (37.99)  (39.44)  (4.61)  (5.14) 
Neighborhood in Cleveland 
Non-NSP 
Mean 
49  39  60  84 
NSP  57  88  60  88 
 
Means Test: t  (10.54)  (58.60)  0.10  (5.02) 
 
   Table 3 - PANEL A: Vacancy Rates by Buyer Type in NSP 1 Areas 






Investor  6,005  21 
Nonprofit  254  48 
Individual  5,869  10 
NSP 
Investor  3,765  30 
Nonprofit  300  64 
Individual  1,717  18 
 
PANEL B: REO Property Characteristics by Buyer Type (Averages) 
(In percentages unless indicated otherwise)  Investor  Nonprofit  Individual 
REO Seller: Local Bank  13  5  14 
REO Seller: Non-Local Bank  67  22  60 
REO Seller: Government  20  73  27 
Post REO Conveyance Amount  22,080  8,031  54,617 
Tax Delinquency  27  22  23 
Age of Property (Years)  84  90  73 
Property Size (SqFt)  1,515  1,537  1,572 
Neighborhood Vacancy Rate  10  12  7 
Neighborhood: Educational Attainment Less 
than High School  27  29  21 
Neighborhood African American Population  56  55  35 
Neighborhood in Cleveland  59  76  41 
 










NSP1 and 2 
 
NSP1 or 2 
  Investor (1)  6.399 
***  7.994 
***  5.272 
***  7.202 
***  8.280 














  Individual (2)  6.008 
***  7.568 
***  4.874 
***  6.771 
***  7.881 














  Nonprofit (3)  6.991 
***  8.495 
***  5.934 
***  7.700 
***  8.687 






































  NSP*Individual  -0.243 
**  -0.025 
 
-0.305 









































  LogExposure  -0.840 
***  -0.857 
***  -0.884 
***  -0.910 
***  -0.874 














  REO_Price  -0.230 
***  -0.252 
***  -0.221 
***  -0.261 
***  -0.290 














  Property_Size  -0.175 
**  -0.139 
*  -0.174 
 
-0.135 
*  -0.207 














  Property_Age  0.504 
***  0.327 
***  0.590 
***  0.382 
***  0.356 














  Useable_Area  -0.236 
**  -0.333 
***  -0.110 
***  -0.200 
*  -0.230 














  Tax_Delinq  0.100 
 
0.167 
**  0.091 
**  0.174 








































  Non_Local Bank  0.150 






















  Block_Vacancy  3.157 
***  3.681 
***  3.110 
***  3.458 
***  2.795 






































  Block_African  0.009 
***  0.009 
***  0.009 
***  0.009 
***  0.009 














  City  -0.284 
***  -0.444 
***  -0.263 
***  -0.432 
***  -0.492 
































     
*** 
  ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.Table 5 – Vacancy Rates by NSP Category and REO Buyer 
   
NSP1  NSP2 
REO BUYER  All  Investor  Individual  Non-Profit  All  Investor  Individual  Non-Profit 
Non-NSP 
N  2,109  1,355  651  103  1,598  1,034  487  77 
Mean  29.5%  28.9%  25.5%  64.1%  25.4%  25.6%  20.3%  54.5% 
NSP 
N  2,109  1,355  651  103  1,598  1,034  487  77 
Mean  30.2%  33.3%  18.3%  65.0%  26.9%  28.5%  18.5%  58.4% 
   t  -0.47  -2.49  3.15  -0.15  -0.97  -1.48  0.73  -0.49 
                   
                   
   
NSP1 Only  NSP2 Only 
REO BUYER  All  Investor  Individual  Non-Profit  All  Investor  Individual  Non-Profit 
Non-NSP 
N  1,551  974  513  64  1,040  653  349  38 
Mean  29.3%  29.4%  24.6%  65.6%  22.8%  24.5%  16.9%  47.4% 
NSP 
N  1,551  974  513  64  1,040  653  349  38 
Mean  28.9%  33.2%  16.6%  62.5%  23.2%  25.6%  16.0%  47.4% 
   t  0.24  -1.81  3.17  0.37  -0.21  -0.45  0.31  0.00 
                   
                   
   
NSP1 and 2  NSP1 or 2 
REO BUYER  All  Investor  Individual  Non-Profit  All  Investor  Individual  Non-Profit 
Non-NSP 
N  558  381  138  39  3,149  2,008  1,000  141 
Mean  30.3%  27.6%  29.0%  61.5%  27.3%  27.4%  22.5%  59.6% 
NSP 
N  558  381  138  39  3,149  2,008  1,000  141 
Mean  33.9%  33.6%  24.6%  69.2%  27.9%  30.8%  17.5%  60.3% 
   t  -1.28  -1.81  0.82  -0.71  -0.51  -2.33  2.80  -0.12 
 
   Table 6 – Vacancy Rates by NSP Category, REO Buyer, and Second Buyer if Resold (We do not test for difference of 
means in extremely small samples.) 
   
NSP 1 
REO BUYER  Investor  NonProfit  Individual 
NEXT BUYER Unsold  Foreclosed  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual 
Non-NSP 
N  937  9  140  269  82  9  12  606  11  33 
Mean  29.6%  77.8%  46.4%  15.6%  72.0%  33.3%  33.3%  25.4%  81.8%  6.1% 
NSP 
N  949  15  177  209  99  2  2  608  13  30 
Mean  34.1%  53.3%  44.6%  16.7%  64.6%  100.0%  50.0%  18.1%  38.5%  13.3% 
   z -2.13 
 
0.32  -0.33  1.05 
   
3.09  2.15  -0.98 
 
   
NSP2 
REO BUYER  Investor  NonProfit  Individual 
NEXT BUYER  Unsold  Foreclosed  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual 
Non-NSP 
N  728  7  132  167  58  11  8  456  11  20 
Mean  24.0%  100.0%  43.9%  15.0%  65.5%  18.2%  25.0%  20.2%  63.6%  0.0% 
NSP 
N  725  10  134  161  65  6  6  455  6  25 
Mean  28.6%  30.0%  43.3%  14.3%  61.5%  50.0%  33.3%  17.6%  33.3%  28.0% 
   z  -1.95 
 
0.11  0.18  0.46 





   
NSP1 Only 
REO BUYER  Investor  NonProfit  Individual 
NEXT BUYER  Unsold  Foreclosed  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual 
Non-NSP 
N  667  7  93  207  53 
 
8  478  9  25 
Mean  31.8%  71.4%  41.9%  14.5%  71.7% 
 
37.5%  24.1%  88.9%  8.0% 
NSP 
N  672  10  122  169  63 
 
1  480  8  25 
Mean  34.7%  60.0%  45.9%  16.0%  63.5% 
 
0.0%  17.1%  37.5%  0.0% 
   z  -1.12 
 
-0.58  -0.40  0.94 
   
2.67 
 
1.44    
NSP2 Only 
REO BUYER  Investor  NonProfit  Individual 
NEXT BUYER  Unsold  Foreclosed  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor Individual 
Non-NSP 
N  458  5  85  105  29  5  4  328  9  12 
Mean  24.0%  100.0%  37.6%  12.4%  58.6%  0.0%  25.0%  16.2%  66.7%  0.0% 
NSP 
N  448  5  79  121  29  4  5  327  1  20 
Mean  25.9%  20.0%  44.3%  12.4%  55.2%  25.0%  20.0%  15.9%  0.0%  15.0% 
   z  -0.65 
 
-0.87  0.00  0.27 





   
NSP1 or 2 
REO BUYER  Investor  NonProfit  Individual 
NEXT BUYER  Unsold  Foreclosed  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual 
Non-
NSP 
N  1,395  14  225  374  111  14  16  934  20  45 
Mean  27.7%  85.7%  43.1%  14.7%  68.5%  21.4%  31.3%  22.2%  75.0%  4.4% 
NSP 
N  1,397  20  256  330  128  6  7  935  14  50 
Mean  31.5%  45.0%  44.5%  15.2%  62.5%  50.0%  28.6%  17.3%  35.7%  14.0% 
   z  -2.17  2.40  -0.31  -0.17  0.97 
   
2.63  2.29  -1.59 
 
   
NSP1 and 2 
REO BUYER  Investor  NonProfit  Individual 
NEXT BUYER  Unsold  Foreclosed  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual 
Non-NSP 
N  270  2  47  62  29  6  4  128  2  8 
Mean  24.1%  100.0%  55.3%  19.4%  72.4%  33.3%  25.0%  30.5%  50.0%  0.0% 
NSP 
N  277  5  55  40  36  2  1  128  5  5 
Mean  32.9%  40.0%  41.8%  20.0%  66.7%  100.0%  100.0%  21.9%  40.0%  80.0% 
   z  -2.27 
 
1.36  -0.08  0.50 
   
1.56 
     Table 7 – March 2010 Vacancy Rates by NSP Category and REO Buyer (REO Exit: 2006 – September 2008) 
(We do not test for difference of means in extremely small samples.) 
   
NSP1 
REO BUYER  All  Investor  Individual  Non-Profit 
Non-NSP 
N  2,678  1,867  792  19 
Mean  30.1%  33.8%  20.7%  63.2% 
NSP 
N  2,674  1,867  788  19 
Mean  27.7%  29.6%  22.5%  63.2% 
 
t  1.95  2.78  -0.85  0.00 
 
 
REO Buyer, and Second Buyer if Resold 
   
NSP 1 
REO BUYER  Investor  NonProfit  Individual 
NEXT BUYER Unsold  Foreclosed  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual  Unsold  Investor  Individual 
Non-NSP 
N  1,008  47  369  442  13    4  685  26  77 
Mean  30.5%  40.4%  43.1%  33.0%  53.8%   75.0%  20.4%  23.1%  18.2% 
NSP 
N  1,035  34  424  367  14    3  709  15  54 
Mean  27.6%  26.5%  40.8%  22.1%  71.4%   0.0%  22.0%  33.3%  24.1% 
   z  1.41  1.30  0.65  3.45  -0.95  
 
-0.71  -0.71  -0.82 
 